MISCELLANEOUS.
KANT AND SPENCER.
To the Editor of The Opeti Coia-t
This is Herbert Spencer's eightieth birthday, and a few of his admirers in this
antipodean city are sending him a congratulatory message, by cable, for we feel
that he, of all English philosophers, has influenced us most.

have spent part of the morning in reperusing Dr. Carus's pamphlet Kant
and I would like to say that it seems to me that Dr. Cams has misapprehended Spencer's criticism of Kant.
Much controversy is raised by the use of the word "intuition". I do not think
Spencer meant by that word anything different from that which Dr. Carus means
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mean just what Dr. Carus calls "pure intuition.'
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think that perhaps Alfred Fouillee in his Histoirc de la Philosophie puts
He says, pp. 397 and 398, " D'apres cela, qu'est ce que I'es-

the question plainer.
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rions rien percevoir, des raoyens par lesquelles nous emissons nos sensations en
series regulieres,
Ce sont, dit Kant, des moules on cadres dans lesquels les
choses viennent prendre la forme qui nous permet de nous les representer; ce sont,
en un mot, les 'formes de la sensibilite'." Indeed, Meiklejohn's and Max Miiller's
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According to Spencer, to take " Space and Time", they have been derived by
"accumulated and consolidated experiences", not in the individual alone but
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through heredity.

To

quote the words of Spencer in his Essay "

On

Space-Consci-

ousness", published in Mind:
" It must also be pointed out that since on the evolution-hypothesis, that consciousness of Space which

we have

the inherited nervous system and
nervous system which yield rudimen-

lies latent in

since, along with those first excitations of the

tary perceptions of external objects, there are produced those

first

excitations of

it,

which yield the rudimentary consciousness of the Space in which the objects exist
it must necessarily happen that Space will appear to be given along with these
rudimentary perceptions in their form. There will necessarily very soon result
something like that inseparability which the Kantists allege. Hence we cannot expect completely to decompose into its elements the Space-consciousness as it exists

—

in ourselves."
It will

be seen from

this extract

wherein the difference between Kant and Spen-

to Kant the forms of Space and Time have not
been derived from experience. According to Spencer they have been so derived.
Both recognise that the " forms", so to speak, exist. To use Dr. Carus's happy expression they are "at-sights", but their " whence and how" is the question. How
have these moulds, if I may use another expression, come to us ? There they are,
like the mould of the linotype-machine into which the molten lead of experience disappears, but how were these moulds formed ? As a thorough-going Evolutionist
Spencer says they are the product of ages of experiences. {Z&e.\\\s PsycJiology 2. ed.)
The only quarrel that one might have with Spencer is that at first sight it might
appear that Space and Time, as forms of sensibility, are confounded with the abstract idea of Space and Time a careful perusal of his Psychology will show, how-

cer in this question
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confound them (p. 360, Vol. II, Psyc]iology). It is plain, I
submit, from his Essay I have quoted, that he rightly appreciated Kant's position.
I do not think Dr. Carus has quite apprehended Spencer's position when he says
that Spencer believes that Kant said " that Space and Time have no application in
the world of objects (i. e., the non-ego)."
Spencer puts his position thus: "To
affirm that Time and Space belong to the ego, is simultaneously to affirm that they
"The Kantian doctrine not only compels
do not belong to the non-ego." Again
us to dissociate from the non-ego these forms as we know them, but practically forI do not know if a
bids us to recognise or suppose any forms for the non-ago ".
Kantian would object to this statement, save in the words I have italicised. The only
"forms of intuition" Kant mentions as existing in order to perception are Space
and Time. The qualities of things, etc., are not "forms".
I may add, one point in which a Kantian may complain of Spencer is that he
has not recognised that, considering the time in which he lived and his environment,
Kant was an advanced Evolutionist. There are passages in his Antliropology, which
though put cautiously and suggestively, show that he believed that even man was a
product of Evolution. Spencer seems to me, however, to be right in saying that a
thorough-going Evolutionist must seek for the origin of the "forms of intuition"
Whether Spencer's view is
in experience; Kant did not do so.
Space and Time
accepted or not, it is n Evolutionist lines and seems to me the only rational explanation given at present of how these forms arose.
John Stuart Mill and Bain sufof having developed their psycholfer from the defects of the old English school
of heredity
were appreciated
ogy before the far-reaching results of Evolution
This is seen if one refers to James Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, and is
also apparent if the first edition of Bain's works be perused.
ever, that he did not so
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